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THE SIXTH AMENDMENT AND CRIMINAL 
SENTENCING 
Stephanos Bibas∗ & Susan Klein∗∗
ABSTRACT 
 
This symposium essay explores the impact of Rita, Gall, and 
Kimbrough on state and federal sentencing and plea bargaining 
systems.  The Court continues to try to explain how the Sixth 
Amendment jury trial right limits legislative and judicial control of 
criminal sentencing.  Equally important, the opposing sides in this 
debate have begun to form a stable consensus.  These decisions inject 
more uncertainty in the process and free trial judges to counterbalance 
prosecutors.  Thus, we predict, these decisions will move the balance of 
plea bargaining power back toward criminal defendants. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Though the earthquakes have subsided, the Supreme Court’s 
sentencing tremors continue to reverberate through the Federal 
Sentencing Guidelines, and by extension to the states.  Rita v. United 
States holds that appellate courts may (but need not) presume within-
Guidelines sentences reasonable.1  Gall v. United States, however, holds 
that appellate courts may not presume outside-Guidelines sentences 
unreasonable but must review all sentences individually and 
deferentially for abuse of discretion.2  Kimbrough v. United States 
allows district courts to disagree with policy choices embedded in the 
Sentencing Guidelines.  Though that case involved the crack/powder 
cocaine disparity, from which the Sentencing Commission itself had 
tried to retreat, the Court’s reasoning allows individual district judges to 
 ∗  Professor, University of Pennsylvania Law School.  E-mail: stephanos *dot* bibas *at* 
gmail *dot* com. 
 ∗∗  Baker & Botts Professor in Law, University of Texas School of Law.  E-mail: 
sklein@law.utexas.edu.  We thank Kevin Richardson for outstanding research assistance. 
 1 Rita v. United States, 127 S. Ct. 2456, 2462, 2464-65 (2007). 
 2 Gall v. United States, 128 S. Ct. 586, 594-97 (2007). 
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disagree with any policy choice of the Commission.3
The Court’s turn toward minimalism,4 and a consensus uniting 
some of the Apprendi v. New Jersey majority with the dissenters, has 
come at the price of clarity.  Some of the Court’s language sounds like it 
comes from Justice Breyer, praising the Sentencing Commission’s 
expertise and rationality.5  Other sections sound like Justice Stevens’ 
work, exalting district court discretion and individualized, deferential 
appellate review even for sentences that deviate from the Guidelines.6  
These split lines of thought are in tension, if not contradictory.  How can 
sentencing law simultaneously pursue centralized uniformity (to reduce 
disparity) and decentralized judicial discretion (to individualize 
sentences)?  And how did the Sixth Amendment right to a criminal jury 
trial on some sentencing facts7 mutate into a quasi-due process right to 
sentencing judge discretion subject only to deferential appellate 
review?8
In this symposium Article, we try to make sense of these doctrinal 
loose ends and what they mean for state as well as federal sentencing.  
We also hazard some guesses about how these doctrinal changes are 
likely to shift the balance of power in plea bargaining.  By injecting 
more uncertainty, and freeing district judges to counterbalance 
prosecutors, Rita, Gall, and Kimbrough probably move the balance of 
bargaining power back toward criminal defendants.  The likely result 
will be lower sentences in the federal and state systems affected by 
Blakely v. Washington, unless and until these changes provoke Congress 
and state legislatures to respond. 
Part I of this Article surveys the main doctrinal twists and turns 
that come out of Rita, Gall, and Kimbrough.  The thorniest remaining 
issue is how much appellate common law can spell out reasonableness 
review without hardening into impermissibly mandatory sentencing 
 3 Kimbrough v. United States, 128 S. Ct. 558, 569-70, 574-75 (2007).   
 4 See generally CASS SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME: JUDICIAL MINIMALISM ON THE 
SUPREME COURT (1999); Cass R. Sunstein, Foreword: Leaving Things Undecided, 110 HARV. L. 
REV. 4 (1996). 
 5 See, e.g., Kimbrough, 128 S. Ct. at 574 (“Carrying out its charge, the Commission fills an 
important institutional role: It has the capacity courts lack to ‘base its determinations on empirical 
data and national experience, guided by a professional staff with appropriate expertise.’” (quoting 
United States v. Pruitt, 502 F.3d 1154, 1171 (10th Cir. 2007) (McConnell, J., concurring))). 
 6 See, e.g., id. (“The sentencing judge, on the other hand, has ‘greater familiarity with . . . the 
individual case and the individual defendant before him than the Commission or the appeals 
court.’  He is therefore ‘in a superior position to find facts and judge their import under § 3353(a)’ 
in each particular case.” (alteration in original) (citation omitted)). 
 7 Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000). 
 8 Gall v. United States, 128 S. Ct. 586, 605 (2007) (Alito, J., dissenting) (“It is telling that 
the rules set out in the Court’s opinion in the present case have nothing to do with juries or 
factfinding and, indeed, that not one of the facts that bears on petitioner’s sentence is disputed.  
What is at issue, instead, is the allocation of the authority to decide issues of substantive 
sentencing policy, an issue on which the Sixth Amendment says absolutely nothing.”). 
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rules.  Part I also considers the unstable constitutional foundation on 
which the Court rests.  While we would not follow Justice Scalia’s Sixth 
Amendment extremism and purism, he is at least logically consistent.  
The majority never responds to him effectively by explaining how its 
holdings rest on the Sixth Amendment. 
Part II then considers how these vagaries of federal law may 
translate to more flexible state sentencing systems.  The majority of 
states will not be affected because they do not use mandatory guidelines 
or presumptive sentencing based upon judicial fact-finding.9  In those 
states affected, many pathologies of federal sentencing will be far less 
problematic because the state guidelines and appellate review under 
them are looser.  In addition, state prosecutors have already learned how 
to circumvent jury sentencing by stacking criminal charges to raise 
maximum sentences without any additional factual findings.10
Part III turns to plea bargaining and considers how greater 
flexibility and uncertainty, and looser appellate scrutiny, are likely to 
change federal plea bargaining dynamics.  Particularly in the federal 
system, where prosecutors were able to use exceedingly tight sentencing 
rules to bind judges and dictate outcomes, the pendulum swing back to 
discretion will help defendants.  It weakens the credibility of 
prosecutors’ threats of retaliation; it empowers district judges to 
counterbalance prosecutors; and it creates uncertainties that defendants 
can trade for lower sentences. 
 
I.     QUESTIONS ANSWERED AND UNANSWERED 
 
A bare five-Justice majority in Apprendi required that juries, not 
judges, find beyond a reasonable doubt any facts that increase a 
defendant’s statutory maximum sentence, except for recidivism.11  Blakely 
extended Apprendi’s rule to facts that raise maximum sentences under a 
state presumptive-sentencing system.12  The same five justices, in 
Booker’s merits-majority opinion, invalidated mandatory Federal 
Sentencing Guidelines, which had required judges to increase maximum 
 9 See Appendix B for the list of 29 states (plus the District of Columbia) unaffected by the 
Blakely decision. 
 10 In many of these jurisdictions, however, sentences cannot be stacked to increase the overall 
penalty without additional judicial factfinding regarding the connection between the multiple 
offenses or the separateness of their harms.  Though most state courts allow it, there is a split as 
to whether Apprendi principles apply to consecutive sentences.  See infra text accompanying 
notes 54-61.  Compare State v. Ice, 170 P.3d 1049 (2007), cert. granted, 128 S. Ct. 1657 (2008) 
(No. 07-901), with People v. Carney, 752 N.E.2d 1137 (Ill. 2001).  See generally Appendix C, 
Tbl. I & IV. 
 11 Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490. 
 12 Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 303-04 (2004) (holding that statutory maximum for 
Apprendi’s rule is the sentence the judge “may impose without any additional findings”). 
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sentences based on their own findings of fact.13
Booker’s remedial-majority opinion sang a very different tune.  The 
four Apprendi and Blakely dissenters, led by Justice Breyer and picking up 
only Justice Ginsburg, not only recast the formerly-mandatory Guidelines 
as advisory, but determined that appellate courts would henceforth review 
sentences for “reasonableness” rather than conformity with the 
Guidelines.14  There is precious little doctrine or theory tying these now-
voluntary guidelines to any kind of meaningful appellate review.  If 
guidelines are truly voluntary, under what circumstances could appellate 
courts reverse a sentence that was free from procedural irregularities? 
The Booker remedial opinion immediately gave rise to a series of 
circuit splits: (1) Could appellate courts presume that within-Guidelines 
sentences are reasonable, as seven of ten circuits did?15  (2) Could 
appellate courts require district judges to offer extraordinary justifications 
for outside-Guidelines sentences, as nine circuits did?16  (3) Could 
appellate courts automatically reverse deviations based on district judges’ 
policy disagreements with the Guidelines, as seven of nine circuits did?17
Rita, Gall, and Kimbrough answer some important questions that 
Booker had left open, and often in surprising ways.  Rita affirmed an 
appellate presumption that within-Guidelines sentences are 
reasonable.18  In Gall and Kimbrough, the Court continued to protect 
district court discretion by overturning two appellate reversals and 
reinstating each district judge’s original sentence.19  Appellate courts 
may presume that within-Guidelines sentences are reasonable, but they 
do not have to do so.20  Trial courts should not apply this presumption.21  
And neither trial nor appellate courts may presume that outside-
Guidelines sentences are unreasonable.22  The Guidelines reflect the 
empirical knowledge and expertise of the Sentencing Commission, and 
 13 United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 226-27 (2005) (merits-majority opinion authored by 
Stevens, J., joined by Scalia, Souter, Thomas, Ginsburg, JJ.). 
 14 Id. at 245 (Breyer, J., dissenting, joined by Rehnquist, C.J., O’Connor, Kennedy, and Ginsburg, 
JJ.) (excising 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b)(1) (the provision making judicial factfinding under the guidelines 
mandatory) and § 3742(e) (the provisions for appellate review of sentences for conformity with these 
mandatory guidelines)).  Justice Scalia lamented in both his Booker and Rita dissents that “[t]he worst 
feature of the scheme is that no one knows—and perhaps no one is meant to know—how advisory 
Guidelines and ‘unreasonableness’ review will function in practice.”  Booker, 543 U.S. at 311 (Scalia, 
J., dissenting in part); Rita v. United States, 127 S. Ct. 2456, 2475 (2007) (Scalia, J., concurring in 
part and concurring in the judgment). 
 15 See Rita, 127 S. Ct. 2456 (2007). 
 16 See Gall v. United States, 128 S. Ct. 586 (2007); Brief for Petitioner at 13 n.3, Gall v. 
United States, 128 S. Ct. 586 (2007) (No. 06-7949). 
 17 Kimbrough v. United States, 128 S. Ct. 558, 566 n.4 (2007). 
 18 Rita, 127 S. Ct. at 2459 (2007). 
 19 Gall, 128 S. Ct. at 598-602; Kimbrough, 128 S. Ct. at 575-76. 
 20 See Rita, 127 S. Ct. at 2462. 
 21 Id. at 2465. 
 22 Id. at 2467. 
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larger departures from the Guidelines require weightier explanations.23  
Nevertheless, appellate courts may not require extraordinary 
justifications or mathematical proportionality for variances from the 
Guidelines.  On the contrary, they must review each sentence, whether 
within or outside the Guidelines, individually and deferentially for 
abuse of discretion.24  The more searching de novo review, mandated by 
Congress in the PROTECT Act, is unconstitutional because it gives 
Guidelines too much binding force.25
Sentencing judges merit deference in part because they see 
individual defendants up close and are best placed to weigh facts and 
credibility.26  Surprisingly, sentencing judges also have leeway to follow 
their own policy preferences, even when they disagree with the 
Sentencing Commission.27  The Guidelines used to impose uniformity 
on divergent policy preferences, but the Court now lets a thousand 
flowers bloom.  District judges, who have long chafed at limits on their 
consideration of offenders’ age and family circumstances, are likely to 
take up this invitation eagerly. 
The interesting question here is how much law is too much.  The 
Court claims to leave some room for appellate review to rein in outliers 
and ensure some consistency, but it insists on deference to the finder of 
fact.  If district judges feel free to depart or vary, the Guidelines are 
truly guidelines and not binding laws that require jury fact-finding.  But 
if they feel completely free, then what is the point of guidelines, except 
perhaps as a reminder or mental anchor?  True, advisory guidelines may 
increase consistency and transparency modestly.28  They provide mental 
anchors, starting points that influence how judges think about cases and 
 23 Gall, 128 S. Ct. at 597 (“We find it uncontroversial that a major departure should be 
supported by a more significant justification than a minor one.”). 
 24 Id. 
 25 United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 259-60 (2005) (Breyer, J., remedial majority 
opinion). 
 26 Gall, 128 S. Ct. at 597-98. 
 27 Kimbrough v. United States, 128 S. Ct. 558, 570 (2007). 
 28 John F. Pfaff, The Continued Vitality of Structured Sentencing Following Blakely: The 
Effectiveness of Voluntary Guidelines, 54 UCLA L. REV. 235, 239-40 (2006) (results of empirical 
comparison between three voluntary guidelines states and five presumptive sentencing states 
found that the former, while not nearly as effective, were nonetheless relatively effective at 
curbing unwarranted sentencing disparity, as compared with the six non-guidelines states in the 
control group); Kim S. Hunt & Michael Connelly, Advisory Guidelines in the Post-Blakely Era, 
17 FED. SENT’G REP. 233 (2005).  But see MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING 37 (Discussion 
Draft Apr. 17, 2006) (explaining that voluntary guideline systems are a failure as compared to 
mandatory guidelines, though two states had marginal success, because such guidelines are 
ignored and thus do not eliminate unwarranted disparity; have failed to control prison 
populations; and because “[n]o state with an advisory sentencing-guidelines system has 
succeeded in generating a practice of meaningful appellate review of the substance of sentencing 
decisions.”); MICHAEL TONRY, SENTENCING MATTERS 27-28 (1996) (“Evaluations showed that 
voluntary guidelines typically had little or no demonstrable effect on sentences imposed . . . .”). 
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where they wind up.29  They create a shared vocabulary that structures 
sentencing discussions.  They also provide benchmarks that allow 
outsiders to compare and critique decisions.  But the main objective of 
sentencing guidelines is to increase consistency and uniformity by 
harmonizing disparate policy views and enforcing these rules through 
appellate review.30  The Court greatly weakens policy uniformity by 
allowing district judges to inject their own policy views.  And it greatly 
weakens appellate policing by mandating substantial appellate 
deference to the application of law to facts. 
One might hope to achieve uniformity by letting appellate case law 
accumulate over time, gradually providing more guidance to district 
courts on the boundaries of their discretion.  Does such a common-law 
process of accretion risk hardening into an impermissibly mandatory 
rule?31  The Court offers little guidance.  At oral argument, the Justices 
agreed only that appellate courts could reverse as unreasonable plainly 
irrational sentences, such as those imposed in a fit of pique or after 
refusal to entertain a factual proffer.32  The Government, however, is 
wrong to claim that the Court’s position will allow each district court to 
make whatever policy decisions it likes.33  Rather, we suggest, the Court 
 29 See United States v. Rubenstein, 403 F.3d 93, 98-99 (2d Cir. 2005) (characterizing the 
Guidelines in post-Booker sentencing as “a benchmark or a point of reference”); Stephanos Bibas, 
Rita v. United States Leaves More Open Than It Answers, 20 FED. SENT’G REP. 28, 31 (2007) 
(noting that after Rita, district judges should still use the Guidelines calculations as “anchors and 
starting points for their analysis”); Stephanos Bibas, Plea Bargaining Outside the Shadow of 
Trial, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2463, 2515–2519 (2004) (discussing the role that anchors and other 
factors play in influencing plea negotiations). 
 30 See, e.g., United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 253 (2005) (Breyer, J., remedial majority 
opinion) (“Congress’ basic goal in passing the Sentencing Act was to move the sentencing system 
in the direction of increased uniformity.”); United States v. Tejeda, 146 F.3d 84, 87 (2d Cir. 1998) 
(Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 was intended to “eliminat[e] disparity on a national level”); see 
also 28 U.S.C. § 994(f) (2006) (“The Commission, in promulgating guidelines pursuant to 
subsection (a)(1), shall promote the purposes set forth in section 991(b)(1) with particular 
attention to the requirements of subsection 991(b)(1)(B) for providing certainty and fairness in 
sentencing and reducing unwarranted sentence disparities.”); U.S. SENT’G COMM., U.S. 
SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 1, pt. A (2007) (discussing Congress’ intention in passing 
the Sentencing Reform Act to reduce the “wide disparity in sentences imposed by different 
federal courts for similar criminal conduct by similar offenders”), available at 
http://www.ussc.gov/2007guid/GL2007.pdf.
 31 See infra text accompanying notes 42-45. 
 32 Transcript of Oral Argument at 19-20, Gall v. United States, 128 S. Ct. 586 (2007) (No. 06-
7949) (defense counsel  pointed to Poynter, where the judge sentenced to the statutory maximum 
as a way to handle unwarranted disparity, and Valdez, where the court departed upwards because 
it was angry that the fraudulent check had been written to the district court); id. at 34 (government 
stated that “[w]e all agree that irrational sentences and procedurally defective sentences are to be 
set aside on reasonableness review.”).  Of course irrational government behavior, like Justice 
Stevens’ example of sentencing the White Sox fans more harshly than Yankee fans in Rita is 
already prohibited by the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.  See Rita 
v. United States, 127 S. Ct. 2456, 2473 (2007) (Stevens, J., concurring); id. at 2482-83 n.6 
(Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). 
 33 Transcript of Oral Argument at 49, Gall v. United States, 128 S. Ct. 586 (2007) (No. 06-
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will find some unspecified level of substantive appellate review 
consistent with the Sixth Amendment. 
A cynic might read these cases as reactions against legislative 
interference.  Booker restores the Court’s own abuse-of-discretion 
standard by rejecting the hated PROTECT Act.34  Kimbrough 
undermines the crack cocaine sentencing ratio kept in place by 
Congress over the Commission’s repeated objection.35  If so, the 
reaction is doctrinally quite strange, though practically effective.  The 
Apprendi line of cases sounds in populism, defending representative, 
responsive juries against the interference of unelected sentencing 
judges.  Now, however, the tables are turned, and the Court is rejecting 
democratic sentencing laws to preserve the independence and freedom 
of those very same unelected sentencing judges.  The turnabout is 
ironic. 
7949).  See infra note 43 and accompanying text for explanation of why substantive 
reasonableness review, at least as defined by this Court, will not create a common law system of 
mandatory guidelines. 
 34 United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 260-62 (2005) (merits majority opinion) 
(invalidating 18 U.S.C. § 3742(e), which required de novo appellate review of departures from 
the Guidelines); Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81, 113 (1996) (adopting abuse-of-discretion 
review of departure decisions and rejecting need for de novo review to police sentencing 
disparities); see also Susan R. Klein, The Return of Federal Judicial Discretion in Criminal 
Sentencing, 39 VAL. U. L. REV.  693, 695, 717-19 (2005) (describing Booker’s remedial opinion 
as the fifth time that Justice Breyer, the architect of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, attempted 
to make the guidelines advisory rather than mandatory, and suggesting that the Booker remedial 
majority opinion was a coalition formed to strike down the Feeney Amendment to the PROTECT 
Act rather than to provide a coherent Sixth Amendment theory); Bibas, supra note 29, at 29 
(noting that Rita was the fifth time that Justice Breyer had instructed appellate courts to defer to 
the Commission by affirming within-Guidelines sentences where possible, or otherwise defer to 
the sentencing judge who gives a reasoned opinion supporting a non-guideline sentence). 
 35 Kimbrough v. United States, 128 S. Ct. 558, 568-69, 575-66 (2007).  Though the 
Sentencing Commission incorporated the 100-to-1 ratio that appeared in the mandatory minimum 
drug statute enacted at the time the guidelines were first being drafted in 1995, it soon proposed 
amendments to lower the ratio to 1-to-1.  See Amendments to the Sentencing Guidelines for 
United States Courts, 60 Fed. Reg. 25074, 25075-25077 (May 10, 1995).  Congress, however, 
rejected those amendments.  See Federal Sentencing Guidelines, Amendment, Disapproval, Pub. 
L. No. 104–38, §1, 109 Stat. 334 (1995).  In 1997, the Commission again recommended to 
Congress to change this ratio—this time proposing a 5-to-1 ratio.  See U.S. SENT’G COMM., 
SPECIAL REPORT TO CONGRESS: COCAINE AND FEDERAL SENTENCING POLICY 2 (Apr. 1997), 
available at http://www.ussc.gov/r_congress/newcrack.pdf.  In 2002, the Commission repeated its 
recommendation in a report suggesting Congress should lower the ratio to “at least” a 20-to-1 
ratio.  See U.S. SENT’G COMM., SPECIAL REPORT TO CONGRESS: COCAINE AND FEDERAL 
SENTENCING POLICY (May 2002), available at 
http://www.ussc.gov/r_congress/02crack/2002crackrpt.pdf.  Congress rejected both of these 
recommendations.  In May 2007, the Commission repeated its recommendation to amend the 
crack cocaine sentencing ratio.  It also adopted a change in the Guidelines, reducing the base 
offense level for each quantity of crack by two levels.  See Sentencing Guidelines for United 
States Courts, 72 Fed. Reg. 28558, 28571-28572 (2007).  Congress allowed that change to take 
effect on Nov. 1, 2007.  Kimbrough, 128 S. Ct. at 568-69, 575-66.  On Dec. 11, 2007, the day 
after Kimbrough was rendered, the Sentencing Commission voted unanimously to make this 
amendment retroactive.  U.S. Sentencing Commission Makes Lighter Crack Penalties 
Retroactive, 82 Crim. L. Rep. (BNA) 331 (Dec. 19, 2007). 
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The turnabout also raises deeper questions about the Court’s shaky 
constitutional foundations.  Justice Scalia argues unsuccessfully but 
with some force that the Sixth Amendment forbids any substantive 
appellate review of judicial sentencing guidelines.36  Courts of appeals, 
he contends, may police district court adherence to procedures.  If, 
however, they exercise any substantive review, then sentencing 
guidelines carry some substantive weight, so only juries may find facts 
that raise them.37
Justice Scalia’s position is extreme—too extreme for our tastes—
but it is logically consistent.  If any factor by law increases punishment, 
then it is an element of an offense reserved for a jury.38  If a deviation is 
reversible on appeal, then it carries some weight by law.  One would 
expect the majority to respond with its own theory as to why some 
appellate review is permissible but more is not.  Unfortunately, the 
majority never engages the issue, other than leaving open the possibility 
of an as-applied Sixth Amendment challenge to a particular above-
guideline sentence.39  It suggests practical reasons why appellate 
deference makes sense, but it offers no constitutional justification for 
rewriting the statute this far but no further. 
We can shed only a little more light.  Justice Scalia has argued 
consistently that meaningful appellate review of sentences for disparity 
cannot coexist with judicial fact-finding under advisory guidelines.  In 
theory, he is right that appellate review of sentences will over time harden 
into a common law of sentencing that will create jury trial rights for those 
facts needed to raise sentences.  In practice, however, these developments 
are unlikely to raise real Sixth Amendment problems.  Moreover, appellate 
review of federal criminal sentences will likely be somewhat more robust 
than the purely procedural review he favors. 
We start with a hypothetical to explain why Justice Scalia is correct 
in theory.  Suppose an appellate panel reverses a sentence that was above 
the suggested guideline range for the offense of conviction but within the 
statutory maximum for that offense as unreasonable because the defendant 
 36 Rita, 127 S. Ct. at 2476 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment); see 
also Klein, supra note 34, at 732-34 (collecting circuit court cases agreeing with this position, and 
suggesting that a judicially-created common law of sentencing could violate Booker in the same 
way as that of the Sentencing Commission, also located nominally in the judicial branch). 
 37 Rita, 127 S. Ct. at 2476, 2482-84 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the 
judgment). 
 38 Moreover, Justice Scalia does not extend his theory to its logical conclusion.  His theory 
should likewise require that juries find beyond a reasonable doubt all affirmative defenses and all 
facts that trigger mandatory minimum penalties.  See Nancy J. King & Susan R. Klein, Essential 
Elements, 54 VAND. L. REV. 1467, 1481-82 (2001) (arguing that there is no logical baseline for 
determining when an additional fact increases rather than decreases a criminal penalty). 
 39 Rita, 127 S. Ct. at 2473 (noting that Justice Scalia’s “need to rely on hypotheticals to make 
his point” confirms that the majority’s approach will not ordinarily raise Sixth Amendment 
issues). 
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was only 19 at the time of his misconduct.40  The fact that the defendant 
must be at least 20 would then become part of “a sort of . . . common law 
of reasonableness developed through the public process.”41  A jury would 
have to make this finding before a judge could impose this higher sentence 
in the future.  The result would be the same if Congress enacted a stand-
alone statute providing that every defendant receive an additional 
consecutive 60 months imprisonment if he commits a crime while being 
over the age of 19.  In theory, it should not matter that judges rather than 
legislatures or sentencing commissions develop these aggravators.  After 
all, very early in our history judges determined both the nature of 
substantive criminal offenses and their penalties through the common law 
process.  Yet, according to Apprendi’s reading of history, there was still a 
jury trial right on every essential element of the offense necessary to 
trigger a particular penalty.42
Though Justice Scalia is thus correct that substantive review could in 
theory present a Sixth Amendment problem, we can rarely if ever identify 
these substantive violations in practice.  The majority applies its forgiving 
abuse-of-discretion standard of review to “all sentencing decisions—
whether inside or outside the Guidelines range.”43  Appellate courts often 
cannot isolate a specific fact or judgment that is necessary to justify the 
imposition of a particularly high or low sentence.  There are as many 
 40 For another example, suppose a statute provided for a zero to 30-year sentence for 
trafficking in a detectable amount of cocaine, and the federal guideline range applicable to this 
statute was 65 to 120 months.  If an appellate court eventually held that it was always 
unreasonable impose a sentence of more than 10 years for less than one kilogram, then the 
effective maximum sentence would be 120 months, not 360 months.  If a judge could not 
sentence over 120 months unless at least one kilogram was involved, then a jury would have to  
find that fact. 
  Conversely, an appellate court could require a sentence of at least 10 years if the drug 
quantity were at least one kilogram.  That mandatory minimum penalty would not be subject to 
the jury requirement, so long as the judge could sentence to 360 months based solely on the jury’s 
finding of a detectable quantity of cocaine.  See Harris v. United States, 536 U.S. 545 (2002) 
(exempting, by 5-4 vote, mandatory minimum penalties from Apprendi rule).  However, the 
Kimbrough and Gall Courts chose to apply the same abuse-of discretion standard to below-
Guideline sentences as to above-Guideline ones, and therefore an appellate court could probably 
not reverse such a sentence. 
 41 Transcript of Oral Argument at 13, Gall v. United States, 128 S. Ct. 586 (2007) (No. 06-
7949) (question by Justice Stevens). 
 42 But see Jonathan F. Mitchell, Apprendi’s Domain, 2006 SUP. CT. REV. 297, 298-99 
(arguing that Apprendi overlooked historical practice of allowing judges to find facts that 
determined degrees of homicide and thus penalties). 
 43 Gall, 128 S. Ct. at 596 (2007).  The Court could have limited Sixth Amendment challenges 
to appellate review of sentences higher but not lower than the otherwise applicable guideline 
range.  The Sixth Amendment, after all, demands that judges remain free at sentencing to increase 
a sentence up to that authorized by the naked jury verdict, but does not demand that judges 
remain free to decrease a sentence.  The Court rejected a review that would have permitted the 
Sixth Amendment to act as a ratchet on judicial discretion, lest “you end up with a quite skewered 
system in which there is–there is vigorous hearty review of departures downward, but–but very, 
very slight review of departures upward.”  Transcript of Oral Argument at 18, Gall, 128 S. Ct. 
586 (2007) (No. 06-7949) (question by Justice Scalia). 
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different reasons for a particular sentence as there are particular 
defendants, ways to commit crimes, and sentencing policies.  The abuse-
of-discretion standard resembles the totality-of-the-circumstances test for 
determining Fourth Amendment reasonable suspicion for a stop or 
probable cause for a search.  There are an almost infinite number of 
possibly relevant facts, policies, and judgments, so each case will be 
unique.  Under a system that eschews binding rules in favor of 
contextual judgment, we can almost never pinpoint which facts were 
necessary for the sentence.  Was it the quantity of drugs or dollars 
stolen?  Was it the defendant’s lack of remorse?  Was it the perceived 
seriousness of mail thefts?  The sentencing judge himself often will not 
be able to articulate it.  Even if he can, he will be loath to flag a possible 
ground for appellate reversal by putting all his eggs in one basket. 
Thus, an appellate court could not reverse a sentence as 
unreasonably high compared to other sentences nationwide because of a 
specific fact, as that would turn that fact into a jury issue.  But it could 
reverse a sentence because under the totality of circumstances, no 
reasonable judge would impose this sentence.  Appellate courts would 
reverse sentences without pinpointing exactly which facts and policies 
their reversals rested on.  This vague approach would resemble the old 
but still constitutional model of unfettered sentencing discretion.  Thus, 
there would be no Sixth Amendment violation. 
It may seem strange to posit that we can have meaningful 
substantive review in part because we cannot isolate which particular 
reason motivated the judge.  This same rationale, however, applies to 
judicial discretion to sentence within a guideline or indeterminate-
sentencing range.  Not even Justice Scalia believes that such discretion 
violates the Sixth Amendment, as indeterminate sentencing has a very 
long pedigree.  Justice Scalia’s argument proves too much.  Taken to its 
logical extreme, Justice Scalia’s argument would require either jury 
sentencing or strictly determinate sentencing, with no judicial discretion 
of any kind.  At some point, the Court must draw a line, necessarily 
artificial and somewhat arbitrary, as to when judicial discretion crosses 
over into the jury’s function.  The majority’s position is a fair 
compromise.  Practicality and historical precedent trump theoretical 
purity. 
Perhaps these practical considerations should lead us to go back 
and question Justice Scalia’s theoretical premises in the first place.  
After all, it seems perverse to say that judges cannot do overtly what 
they can do opaquely.  The majority’s approach, by requiring sentencing 
judges to articulate the facts on which they rely and authorizing 
appellate review, encourages judicial candor, transparency, and 
predictability in exercising the discretion that inevitably remains. 
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II.     APPLYING FEDERAL GUIDANCE TO THE STATES 
 
Rita, Gall, and Kimbrough will most likely have little effect on 
state sentencing systems and state plea bargaining.  This trio of cases 
may, in permitting weak appellate reasonableness review of sentences 
consistent with the Sixth Amendment jury trial right, slightly affect 
sentencing practice in those states that use voluntary guidelines, and 
may even slightly influence future legislative choice between 
sentencing systems.  That will depend upon exactly how deferential 
appellate review of sentences must be to avoid hardening voluntary 
guidelines into mandatory rules.  However, we predict that any effects 
on states will be quite weak compared with Blakely and Booker’s effect 
on the federal system. 
A slight majority of states (twenty-nine states and the District of 
Columbia) were not immediately affected by the Blakely and Booker 
opinions.  Seventeen of these states granted judges unfettered discretion 
to sentence within a range.44  Eight jurisdictions had guideline systems 
in place that were sufficiently voluntary so that judicial fact-finding did 
not trigger any jury issues.45  And five others used jury sentencing.46  
Even in those states, however, legislatures were indirectly affected:  
they knew after Blakely and Booker that their choices for sentencing 
reform had narrowed.  The only way to ensure that a fact has a 
determinative effect on a defendant’s sentence is to send that fact to a 
jury.  Mandatory sentencing guidelines can no longer compel judges to 
find and give specified weight to particular facts.47  Thus Booker and 
Blakely will influence the direction of any sentencing reform in those 
jurisdictions.  Legislatures will have to choose between offering all 
relevant facts to juries and trusting judges to account for those facts 
through voluntary guidelines. 
We have already begun to see this effect.  Though eight 
 44 Appendix B (noting that 17 states—Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Iowa, Louisiana, Massachusetts, 
Mississippi, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, North Dakota, Rhode Island, South 
Carolina, South Dakota, West Virginia, and Wyoming—used indeterminate judicial sentencing before 
Blakely). 
 45 Appendix B (noting that a total of eight jurisdictions—Alabama, Delaware, Washington D.C., 
Maryland, Pennsylvania, Utah, Virginia, and Wisconsin—had voluntary guideline systems that used 
judicial fact-finding before Blakely). 
 46 Appendix B (noting that five states—Arkansas, Kentucky, Missouri, Oklahoma, and Texas—
had jury sentencing before Blakely).  These jurisdictions continue to use jury sentencing today. 
 47 However, a legislature could theoretically replicate mandatory guidelines and avoid the jury by 
raising the maximum penalty for each offense to life imprisonment and then insisting upon judicial 
fact-finding that triggered mandatory minimum penalties.  Congress rejected this course of action.  
See Defending America’s Most Vulnerable: Safe Access to Drug Treatment and Child Protection Act 
of 2005, H.R. 1528, 109th Cong., 1st Sess. § 12 (2005) (proposing transformation of Federal 
Sentencing Guidelines into a complex series of mandatory minimum penalties). 
 
786 CARDOZO LAW REVIEW  [Vol. 30:3 
 
jurisdictions had voluntary guidelines systems in place before Blakely, 
Blakely and Booker encouraged five additional states to transform their 
mandatory guideline systems into advisory ones.48  A sixth state, 
Indiana, responded to Blakely by transforming its presumptive 
sentencing scheme to an indeterminate one.49  States that, for whatever 
reasons, trust judges enough to adopt indeterminate sentencing or 
voluntary guidelines to begin with probably will not be swayed by Rita, 
Kimbrough, and Gall.50  After all, those cases limited how binding 
guidelines could be but did nothing to cast doubt on discretionary 
sentencing. 
Twenty-one state sentencing systems used judicial fact-finding to set 
presumptive or mandatory guidelines sentences and thus were 
constitutionally vulnerable.  While Blakely and Booker influenced these 
systems significantly, Rita, Gall, and Kimbrough are likely to affect them 
only marginally.  The most prevalent reaction to Blakely was to send 
facts formerly found by judges to juries.  Thirteen states responded, at 
least initially, in this manner.51  The jurisdictions that chose this route 
rather than advisory guidelines or indeterminate sentencing should be 
unaffected by Rita, Gall, and Kimbrough.  Former sentencing factors 
that became jury findings will be reviewed by the same standard as all 
other jury findings in criminal cases.  If there is a general verdict of 
guilt (with those facts now included in the jury instructions), the court 
of appeals will affirm the conviction if a rational jury could have found 
for the government.  If the trial is bifurcated, the court of appeals will 
affirm the jury’s findings of sentencing facts if any rational jury, 
drawing all inferences in a light favorable to the government, could 
have found those facts.  Booker’s reasonableness standard of appellate 
review simply does not apply to the review of jury findings. 
 48 Appendix A, tbl. III (noting that three state legislatures–California, Indiana, and Tennessee–
enacted legislation changing their formerly mandatory guidelines into voluntary ones in the wake of 
Blakely, and that two states courts, New Jersey and Ohio, remedied Blakely violations by removing 
the mandatory nature of the guidelines, as did the Supreme Court in Booker itself). 
 49 Appendix A, tbl. II (noting that the Indiana legislature responded to the State Supreme Court’s 
conclusion that the appropriate Blakely remedy is to send aggravating facts to the jury by instead 
enhancing judicial discretion). 
 50 Of course jurisdictions like Texas, with jury sentencing, will be as unaffected by Gall and 
Kimbrough as they were by Blakely and Booker. 
 51 See Appendix A, tbl. II (listing 13 states where the court responded to Blakely by sending facts 
to the jury (Alaska, Arizona, Colorado, Connecticut, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, Maine, Minnesota, 
North Carolina, Oregon, Vermont, and Washington)); id. tbl. IV (listing nine states where the 
legislature responded by submitting aggravating facts to the jury (Alaska, Arizona, Kansas, Illinois, 
Minnesota, North Carolina, Oregon, Vermont, and Washington)).  Note that some of these states are 
listed twice, as the court decision was later codified by the legislature.  In a tenth state, Hawaii, 
legislation is pending to send to juries aggravating facts necessary to impose an extended term to the 
jury.  H.B. No. 1152, 24th Leg. (Haw. 2007), available at 
http://capitol.hawaii.gov/session2008/bills/HB1152_HD1_.pdf.  
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In some of the states that turned to jury findings to comply with 
Blakely, prosecutors have discovered that they can frequently demand 
higher sentences than those authorized by the naked jury verdict by 
charging multiple offenses.  In most jurisdictions, judges may or must 
stack criminal sentences under certain circumstances.  In other words, 
the defendant must serve her multiple sentences consecutively rather 
than concurrently.  Where judges have complete discretion to choose 
whether or not to stack, there is no Sixth Amendment concern.52  
However, in many jurisdictions, judges are not authorized to stack 
sentences unless they first make certain findings, such as whether the 
total sentence was necessary to protect the public,53  whether the crimes 
were both crimes of violence arising out of the same incident,54 whether 
the defendant was on probation or release when he committed the 
crime,55 whether the crime was committed in an especially cruel 
manner,56 or whether the defendant had a particular relationship with the 
victim or physically or mentally damaged the victim.57  A few states 
have determined that these factual findings must be made by a jury for 
the practice to comport with Blakely.58  Most states, however, uphold 
judicial findings of these facts.  They reason that Apprendi, Blakely, and 
Cunningham concerned a single sentence each and do not forbid judge-
triggered aggregation of sentences.  There is now a circuit split on this 
issue, and the Supreme Court has granted certiorari to resolve the 
issue.59
We see both sides of this issue.  On the one hand, there is not a lot 
of difference between stacking and the practices outlawed by Apprendi 
and Booker.  In both instances, the judge is forbidden to increase a 
defendant’s sentence without additional findings of fact.  If a judge must 
impose concurrent sentences in the absence of an additional fact, in 
what sense is the combined sentence from multiple jury verdicts truly 
the statutory maximum under Blakely?  On the other hand, the two 
situations are distinguishable.  When a judge finds at sentencing that a 
 52 See Appendix C, tbl. II (listing five states where judges have complete discretion as to whether 
or not to stack sentences).  Likewise, federal judges have discretion after Booker on the issue of 
stacking.  See Appendix C, tbl. III. 
 53 See, e.g., Vandergriff v. State, 125 P.3d 360, 362 (Alaska Ct. App. 2005); People v. 
Wagener, 752 N.E.2d 430, 441–42 (Ill. 2001). 
 54 See, e.g., People v. Lehmkuhl, 117 P.3d 98, 106-07 (Colo. Ct. App. 2005); State v. Senske, 
692 N.W.2d 743, 746–48 (Minn. Ct. App. 2005). 
 55 See, e.g., State v. Keene, 927 A.2d 398, 407-08 (Me. 2007). 
 56 See, e.g., State v. Abdullah, 878 A.2d 746, 756-57 (N.J. 2005). 
 57 See, e.g., State v. Higgins, No. E2006-01552, 2007 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 763, at *42 
(Sept. 27, 2007). 
 58 Courts in Ohio, Oregon, and Washington have found that imposing consecutive sentences only 
where the court finds certain facts violates the principles of Blakely.  See Appendix C, tbl. IV. 
 59 State v. Ice, 170 P.3d 1049 (Ore. 2007), cert. granted, 128 S. Ct. 1657 (2007).  As this article 
went to press, the Court decided 5-4 in Oregon v. Ice that judges rather than juries may find facts 
that trigger consecutive rather than concurrent sentences.  Oregon v. Ice, 129 S. Ct. 711 (2009). 
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robber used a gun, Apprendi plausibly interprets this finding as a 
judicial conviction for armed robbery, a crime more serious than the 
jury’s verdict of ordinary robbery.  Armed robbery is indeed a distinct 
crime in many criminal codes, one that the jury could have found.  The 
gun finding enhances both the defendant’s loss of liberty and arguably 
the stigma that he suffers.60  But when a judge runs two sentences 
consecutively, she brands the defendant with no additional stigma and in 
no sense convicts the defendant of an aggravated crime.  The jury has 
already authorized the maximum punishment for each crime and has not 
demanded that they run concurrently.  The judge simply determines how 
to carry out those authorized punishments. 
Some of these state stacking factors, such as the vulnerability of 
the victim and the defendant’s possession of a weapon or use of 
violence, are facts that a jury could resolve.  Others, such as the need to 
protect the public or to prevent sentencing disparity, appear particularly 
ill-suited for jury determination.  Should amenability to jury resolution 
make a difference?  The Court thus far claims that the type of fact is 
irrelevant.  With each new sentencing issue to arise, however, the 
argument that judicial discretion inherently includes certain findings 
grows stronger.61  A change on this issue would have quite an impact on 
state and federal sentencing. 
 
III.     THE IMPACT ON FEDERAL PLEA BARGAINING 
 
Most sentences are not resolved through hotly contested sentencing 
hearings and appeals.  Rather, the vast majority of defendants enter plea 
bargains,62 which often agree upon sentences in the hopes that judges 
will rubber-stamp them.  Even though these sentence bargains do not 
involve sentencing hearings or appeals, the parties bargain at least in 
part in the shadow of the likely sentence.63  When prosecutors hold all 
the aces at sentencing, they can drive hard bargains.  Conversely, when 
their hands are weaker or less predictable, it is easier for defendants to 
 60 Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 484, 495 (2000) (regulating sentence enhancements 
to protect defendants against increased loss of liberty and stigma of conviction). 
 61 Cf. Douglas A. Berman & Stephanos Bibas, Making Sentencing Sensible, 4 OHIO ST. J. 
CRIM. L. 37 (2006) (advocating that Blakely apply to offense facts, such as use of a weapon or 
amount of injury or loss, but not to offender facts, such as criminal history or personal 
characteristics). 
 62 According to the United States Sentencing Commission, in 2007 95.8% of federal criminal 
defendants pleaded guilty.  U.S. SENT’G COMM., SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING 
STATISTICS fig. C (2007), available at http://www.ussc.gov/ANNRPT/2007/SBtoc07.htm.  Most 
of these pleas result from plea bargains, though there are no hard data to quantify the exact 
proportion. 
 63 But cf. Bibas, supra note 29 (exploring structural and psychological forces that warp plea 
bargains and cause them to deviate from expected trial outcomes). 
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bluff about insisting on a sentencing hearing or call prosecutors’ bluffs. 
On their faces, Booker, Rita, Gall, and Kimbrough say nothing 
about raising or lowering sentences or about plea bargaining, short of 
reminding us that defendants can waive their sentencing rights.64  These 
cases do, however, drastically increase district court discretion to depart 
or vary from the Federal Guidelines.  Courthouse wisdom and 
occasional judicial outbursts indicate that most district judges think the 
Guidelines are too harsh and resent appellate pressure to conform to 
them.65  The steady stream of judge-induced downward departures, 
compared with the trickle of upward departures, confirms that district 
judges like to reduce sentences.66  And the frequent reversals of 
downward departures show that appellate courts constrain district 
courts’ desires to move downward.67
The Court’s cases loosening sentencing oversight have two effects, 
we hypothesize, both of which are likely to help defendants.  First, the 
cases give district judges much more latitude to follow their desires for 
lower sentences.  Appellate courts must now review their decisions 
deferentially, for abuse of discretion, rather than de novo as the 
PROTECT Act required for downward departures.68  The overwhelming 
 64 United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 244 (2005) (merits majority opinion) (“Prosecutors 
and defense attorneys would still resolve the lion’s share of criminal matters through plea 
bargaining, and plea bargaining takes place without a jury.”).  In Booker, Justice Breyer discussed 
plea-bargaining at some length in his remedial opinion.  Id. at 255-57. 
 65 See Jack B. Weinstein & Nicholas R. Turner, The Cost of Avoiding Injustice by Guideline 
Circumvention, 9 FED. SENT’G REP. 298 (1997) (lamenting the frequent injustices that 
accompany the guidelines and describing how federal judges use various methods to circumvent 
the guidelines, as much as 35% of the time, quoting District Judge Thomas Hogan and Circuit 
Judges Edwards and Bright); MOLLY T. JOHNSON & SCOTT A. GILBERT, FED. JUD. CTR., THE 
U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES: RESULTS OF THE FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER’S 1996 SURVEY 3-
4 (1997) (73% and 69% of district and circuit judges respectively believe mandatory guidelines 
are unnecessary); Hon. Nancy Gertner, From Omnipotence to Impotence: American Judges and 
Sentencing, 4 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 523, 530, 539 (2007) (describing how the initial “robust 
judicial opposition to the Guidelines” in 1986 slowly transformed to acceptance over the next two 
decades, and predicting that post-Booker judges will again “learn to critically evaluate the 
sentence the Guidelines suggest, to apply the teachings of social scientists, . . . and to temper the 
harsh effects of sentencing policy with . . . mercy”).
 66 In 2007, only 1.5% sentences were above the Guideline range.  Contrast that with 12% of 
sentences that fell below the Guideline range—not including the 25.6% of government-sponsored 
below-the-range sentences.  SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING STATISTICS, supra note 62, 
at tbl. N.  It might appear contradictory to note both that district judges want to decrease 
sentences, and that the average federal sentence length has continued to increase very slightly 
from 56 months prior to the 2003 PROTECT Act to 57 months after PROTECT to 58 months 
post-Booker.  However, this statistic is attributable, according to the Sentencing Commission, to 
the rise in the presumptive sentences under the Guidelines, an increase in prosecutions for more 
serious offenses, and a stiffening of penalties in federal statutes.  U.S. SENT’G COMM., FINAL 
REPORT ON THE IMPACT OF UNITED STATES V. BOOKER ON FEDERAL SENTENCING 69-76 (March 
2006) [hereinafter BOOKER REPORT].
 67 See Stephanos Bibas, Max M. Schanzenbach, & Emerson H. Tiller, Policing Politics at 
Sentencing, 103 NW. U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2009). 
 68 Booker, 543 U.S. at 260-62; Prosecutorial Remedies and Tools Against the Exploitation of 
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majority of below-guideline (but not above-guideline) sentences after 
Booker were reversed as unreasonable under the extraordinary 
circumstances test employed by every circuit prior to Gall.69  Now that 
courts of appeals are more likely to affirm those lower sentences, 
district judges should display an even greater willingness to sentence 
below the formerly mandatory guideline range.70  And appellate courts 
may not presume that outside-Guideline sentences are unreasonable.71  
Conversely, the safe harbor of remaining within the Guidelines is no 
longer quite as safe.  Appellate courts are supposed to review within-
Guidelines sentences substantively for their reasonableness instead of 
treating them as per se reasonable.72  Thus, district courts should feel 
significantly freer to lower sentences if that is their desire. 
This is precisely what happened immediately after Booker.  U.S. 
Sentencing Commission data on post-Booker cases show that after 
Booker, the percentage of outside—(almost exclusively below)—
Guidelines sentences skyrocketed.  The proportion of non-government 
sponsored, below-range sentences increased from 8.6% pre-PROTECT 
Act to 12.5% post-Booker.73  The large increase is even more striking if 
we limit our post-Booker comparison to sentencing decisions after the 
PROTECT Act in 2003 (when district judges felt particularly 
constrained):  the percentage almost doubled from 6.3% to 12.5%.74  
Judges departed downwards from the Guidelines during the period 
between Booker and Gall not just for substantial assistance, aberrant 
behavior, and the few other reasons recognized by the Commissioners.  
They departed for as many reasons as creative and motivated defense 
counsel were able to imagine.75
If the past is any guide to the future, Kimbrough and Gall should 
make “[d]istrict [c]ourt judges feel almost as frisky as would a pay 
Children Today Act of 2003 (Protect Act), Pub. L. No. 108-21, 117 Stat. 650 (2003). 
 69 Brief for the Petitioner, Gall, 2007 WL 2197584 (U.S. 2007) (No. 06-7949); see also 
BOOKER REPORT, supra note 66, at 30 exh. 2 (showing that 15 out of the 21 below-Guideline 
sentences imposed between Booker and March 2006 were reversed as unreasonable, while only 2 
out of the 16 above-Guideline range cases were reversed on appeal as unreasonable.  Of the 
scores of within-Guideline range sentences, only ne was reversed as unreasonable.). o
 70 Brief for the Petitioner at 10-11 n.2, Gall, 2007 WL 2197584 (U.S. 2007) (No. 06-7949) 
(listing circuit courts that adopted extraordinary circumstances test between Booker and Gall). 
 71 Gall v. United States, 128 S. Ct. 586, 594-95, 597 (2007) (embracing the government’s 
concession to that effect). 
 72 Rita v. United States, 127 S. Ct. 2456, 2474 (2007) (Stevens, J., concurring). 
 73 BOOKER REPORT, supra note 66, at 77. 
 74 Id. 
 75 Id. at 81 tbl. 7 (listing Booker reasons provided by judges, including, inter alia, family ties, 
physical and mental condition,  age, need to adequately deter criminal conduct, need to provide 
defendant with educational/vocational training, protecting public from further crimes, voluntary 
disclosure, rehabilitation, reflecting seriousness of crime, promoting respect for law, just 
punishment, reducing disparity, providing restitution to victim, and loss issues). 
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raise.”76  In the few short months since these decisions were rendered, 
some prominent district judges are already hailing their new-found 
freedom publicly in scholarly writings.77
Second, district courts are likely not only to be more lenient but 
also to vary more widely at sentencing, now that appellate oversight is 
relaxed.78  Prosecutors and defense counsel will thus have a harder time 
predicting the likely result of a sentencing hearing and appeal.  In 
theory, this uncertainty could cut in either direction.  Prosecutors might 
be overconfident in their cases, leading them to insist on harder 
bargains.  Because they are repeat players and can gamble on having a 
certain percentage of sentencing hearings, they might hang tough, 
counting on poorly paid defense counsel to twist their clients’ arms into 
pleading guilty at higher prices.79
That story is plausible, but another one strikes us as more likely.  
Prosecutors too are overworked, and they are less invested personally in 
the outcomes of their cases than are defendants.  Moreover, prosecutors 
care primarily about the certainty of a conviction and less about the 
severity of the sentence, as long as the defendant gets some prison 
time.80  Defendants, however, care about severity quite a bit.  Moreover, 
mandatory Guidelines set mental anchors and starting points for 
bargaining, so that the default sentence seems to be a high number 
 76 Posting of Professor Craig Bradley to owner-crimprof@chicago.kent.law.edu (Jan. 31, 
2008) (on file with the authors). 
 77 See, e.g., Posting of Gerard E. Lynch to Ohio State Journal of Criminal Law Amici, Letting 
Guidelines Be Guidelines (and Judges be Judges), http://osjcl.blogspot.com (Jan. 18, 2008) 
(cheering the fact that Federal Sentencing Guidelines are now truly advisory, but suggesting that 
district judges exercise some restraint); Posting of Richard G. Kopf to Ohio State Journal of 
Criminal Law Amici, The Top Ten Things I Learned from Apprendi, Blakely, Booker, Rita, 
Kimbrough and Gall, http://osjcr.blogspot.com (Jan. 18, 2008) (tongue-in-cheek critique of 
harshness of Guidelines and inexperience of appellate judges and Supreme Court justices). 
 78 New numbers from the U.S. Sentencing Commission appear to confirm the observation in 
the text.  Data from Fiscal Year 2007 show that the percentage of within-Guideline range 
sentences varied widely within the circuits.  For example, within the Second Circuit, judges in the 
Eastern District of New York sentenced within the Guideline range only 41.5% of the time, while 
judges in the Western district followed the guidelines 58% of the time.  Within the Fourth Circuit, 
judges in the Southern District of West Virginia stayed within the guidelines 87% of the time, 
while judges in Maryland sentenced within the guideline range only 51.5% of the time.  Every 
circuit and district shows similar wide variations.  SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING 
STATISTICS, supra note 62, tbl. 26. 
 79 For a discussion of how the overoptimism bias and underfunding of defense counsel warp 
plea bargaining, see Bibas, Plea Bargaining Outside the Shadow of Trial, supra note 29, at 2476-
82, 2498-502. 
 80 See. e.g., MILTON HEUMANN, PLEA BARGAINING: THE EXPERIENCES OF PROSECUTORS, 
JUDGES, AND DEFENSE ATTORNEYS 110-114 (2d ed. 1978) (explaining that reducing uncertainty 
and the risks of trial are important to prosecutors and lead to a desire to plea-bargain); G. 
NICHOLAS HERMAN, PLEA BARGAINING 5-10 (1997) (describing a variety of factors that affect a 
prosecutor’s interests and objectives); Joshua Bowers, Punishing the Innocent, 156 U. PENN. L. 
REV. 1117 (2008) (citing literature supporting claim that prosecutors, especially state prosecutors 
bringing misdemeanor charges, are more interested in racking up convictions than increasing 
sentence length). 
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rather than zero.  But when mandatory Guidelines become fuzzy rules-
of-thumb, they may have less power as mental anchors.  Defendants, 
particularly if they are free on bail, will treat liberty as their status quo 
and any imprisonment as a loss, which they are reluctant to accept.  As 
stories circulate in jail about the defendant who convinced a judge to 
give him probation,81 defendants will indulge their overoptimism, each 
thinking that he too will get lucky with the judge.  Thus, the fuzzier 
mental anchor, the framing of zero as the starting point, overoptimism, 
and aversion to losses will all combine to stiffen defendants’ spines.  
Defendants are more likely to dig in their heels, demanding more 
generous concessions before they will plead guilty.82
When the Guidelines seemed more or less automatic, a prosecutor 
could credibly claim that his hands were tied.  All he could offer many 
defendants in exchange for pleading guilty was a 25% to 35% discount 
for acceptance of responsibility.83  Now, prosecutors can no longer 
claim that Guidelines sentences are inexorable.  A market that tried to 
create sticker-price shopping looks more like a Turkish bazaar, with 
more room for individualized dickering.84  And if the prosecutor is 
obstinate, the defendant can more credibly threaten to go around him 
and put his case to the judge.85
 81 Newspapers were filled with such stories, most of them accurate, in the months following 
Booker.  See Klein, supra note 34, at 726-30 & n.152-71 (collecting cases in which judges around 
the country sentenced well below the Guideline range, often to probation, based upon such factors 
as the defendant’s physical or mental condition;  family circumstances;  rehabilitation 
efforts,;ability to pay restitution;  minimal role in the offense; and employment history; the 
judge’s disagreement with the guidelines choice of amount of loss rather than personal culpability 
in white collar cases; the parsimony provision; the racial disparity stemming from the 
crack/powder ratio; and the government’s refusal to bring a substantial assistance motion). 
 82 Bibas, Plea Bargaining Outside the Shadow of Trial, supra note 29, at 2498-502, 2508-19.  
The Commission does not keep separate statistics indicating whether federal criminal sentences 
were after trial or guilty plea.  Thus it would be extremely difficult to gather empirical support for 
the proposition that plea deals are improving post-Booker or post-Gall.  We do note, however, 
that government-requested sentences below the Guideline range, a good indicator to us of a 
negotiated settlement, have increased from about 20% immediately after PROTECT to 23.7% in 
2006 and 25.6% in 2007.  See BOOKER REPORT, supra note 66, at vii & 55 fig.2; U.S. SENT’G 
COMM., PRELIMINARY QUARTERLY DATA REPORT: 2ND QUARTER RELEASE 1 tbl. 1 (2007), 
available at http://www.ussc.gov/sc_cases/Quarter_Report_2Qrt_07.pdf. 
 83 Bibas, Plea Bargaining Outside the Shadow of Trial, supra note 29, at 2488-89; U.S. 
SENT’G COMM., U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3E1.1 nn.2-3 (2004) (authorizing 
two- or three-level downward adjustment for acceptance of responsibility, and explaining that the 
adjustment ordinarily does not apply to defendants who go to trial but that pleading guilty and 
truthfully admitting the crime “constitute significant evidence of acceptance of responsibility”). 
 84 But see Gerard E. Lynch, Our Administrative System of Criminal Justice, 66 FORDHAM L. 
REV. 2117, 2130 (1998) (explaining that for many crimes in busy jurisdictions, prices are fixed 
by going rates rather than individually dickered, at least in ordinary cases). 
 85 This threat will depend in large part upon what jurisdiction the defendant is in and which 
particular judge he draws.  While rates of within-range sentences decreased for each of the twelve 
circuits from the post-PROTECT Act period to the post-Booker period, there is a marked 
difference between the low of 44.4% within-range sentence in the Ninth Circuit to the high of 
71.8% within-range sentence for the Fifth Circuit.  BOOKER REPORT, supra note 66, at 86.  Even 
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Moreover, the analysis above assumes that prosecutors are trying 
to raise sentences.  But in some areas, and for some individual cases, 
line prosecutors may think sentences are too severe.  This is especially 
true in many United States Attorney’s Offices, where most prosecutors 
are not political appointees and have varying views on the current 
Administration’s sentencing policies.  Though Main Justice in 
Washington, D.C., is nominally in charge, Assistant U.S. Attorneys 
spread across 94 U.S. Attorney’s Offices prosecute the lion’s share of 
federal criminal cases.  In our experience, a fair number of these 
assistants chafe at the Department’s insistence on draconian penalties 
and strict centralized oversight of charging and sentencing.  Some 
prosecutors think this about white-collar sentences, which the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act raised substantially.86  Others think so about federal drug 
sentences87 or other crimes.  Though these prosecutors may want to 
ensure substantial sentences for these serious crimes, they may feel that 
recent sentence increases have gone too far. 
Prosecutors who want to lower sentences, either openly or with a 
nod and a wink, can now agree to or acquiesce in defendants’ motions 
for variances from the Guidelines.  Doing so serves not only their sense 
of justice, but also their self-interest in disposing of their dockets 
quickly.  These prosecutors form relationships with the local judges 
before whom they practice.  When the choice is between pleasing Main 
Justice and pleasing the district judge who rules on all of their motions, 
the judge wins every time.  Local practice varies, but in many districts, 
judges will refuse to accept a Rule 11(c)(1)(C) plea that binds them to a 
particular negotiated sentence.  Likewise, many judges will reject a plea 
(ostensibly required by Main Justice) that requires a defendant to waive 
his Booker rights and agree to a Guideline sentence.88  In these 
more important than the circuit is the district where charges are brought and which judge a 
defendant draws within that district.  “Differences among the culture and practices of district 
courts were found to contribute to regional variation in departure rates more than differences 
among the circuits.”  Id. at 85, 93 tbl. 11 (listing departure rates pre- and post-Booker for each of 
the 94 districts). 
 86 Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002); U.S. SENT’G COMM., U.S. SENTENCING 
GUIDELINES MANUAL (Supp. 2002); see Ellen S. Podgor, Throwing Away the Key, 116 YALE L.J. 
POCKET PART 279, 281-282 (2007), http://thepocketpart.org/2007/02/21/podgor.html (“The 
sentences given to white-collar offenders seem oddly imbalanced when compared to those given 
to international terrorists and violent criminals.”); Sara Sun Beale, Is Corporate Criminal 
Liability Unique?, 44 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1503, 1519 (2007) (“Federal sentences are indeed 
draconian, and generally longer than state sentences for comparable conduct.”). 
 87 See Frank O. Bowman, III & Michael Heise, Quiet Rebellion? Explaining Nearly a Decade 
of Declining Federal Drug Sentences, 86 IOWA L. REV. 1043 (2001); Frank O. Bowman, III & 
Michael Heise, Quiet Rebellion II: An Empirical Analysis of Declining Federal Drug Sentences 
Including Data from the District Level, 87 IOWA L. REV. 477 (2002). 
 88 See infra note 90 (describing Comey memorandum); FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(c)(1) (describing 
three types of plea agreements, two permitting the judge sentencing discretion despite negotiated 
plea, and one binding the judge to the negotiated sentence once she agrees to accept the plea); 
Interview with Chief Assistant U.S. Attorney Anthony Brown, W. Dist. of Texas, in Austin, Tex. 
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jurisdictions, defense counsel always has the opportunity to argue for a 
lower sentence, giving the defendant hope and the judge discretion to 
make that hope a reality. 
Line prosecutors’ supervisors may try to police or rein in this 
leniency, but their monitoring and information are necessarily imperfect.  
Main Justice policies in effect since the Guidelines era purport to 
disallow leniency in charging and penalty decisions.89  New policies in 
effect since Booker purport to disallow government stipulation to 
below-Guideline range sentences in negotiated pleas.90  But Washington 
cannot easily oversee and enforce compliance.  The policies contain 
loopholes; appealing low sentences risks creating bad circuit precedents, 
and distance and collegiality prevent micro-management from 
Washington.91  The Department’s attempt to recreate a pre-Booker world 
through charging and pleading rules has failed, and conformity with the 
Federal Sentencing Guidelines continues to decrease.  When both line 
prosecutors and judges want to collude to lower sentences and dispose 
of cases, it is hard to stop them.92
Under the formerly mandatory Guidelines, one of the few ways to 
lower one’s sentence was to cooperate with the Government by 
providing substantial assistance against other criminals.  Defendants 
needed to persuade the Government that their assistance was substantial 
enough that the Government should file a motion on their behalf.  If the 
(June 29, 2007). 
 89 See Memorandum from Richard Thornburgh, Attorney General, reprinted in 6 FED. 
SENT’G REP. 352 (1994) (requiring that prosecutors charge, and defendants plead to, the “most 
serious, readily provable offense”); Memorandum of John Ashcroft, Attorney General, reprinted 
in 6 FED. SENT’G REP. 347 (1994). 
 90 See, e.g., Memorandum from Director Buchanan, Executive Office for U.S. Attorneys (Jan. 
12, 2005) (providing that the government must argue that only sentences within the guideline 
range are reasonable); Memorandum of Deputy Attorney General James Comey (Jan. 26, 2005) 
(providing that all government attorneys must follow Attorney General Ashcroft’s charging and 
pleading memorandum, that there be no government stipulations to sentences outside the 
guidelines range without prior Main Justice approval, that all below-guideline sentences be 
reported and appealed); Memorandum of Deputy Attorney General James Comey (July 2, 2004) 
(providing that all AUSAs must require defendants to waive Blakely rights as part of every plea 
deal).   
 91 There has always been wiggle room as to what charges are readily provable, and the 
Memorandum of Janet Reno, Attorney General, reprinted in 6 FED. SENTENCING REP. 352 
(1994), added a longer list of exceptions to the Thornburgh memo.  AUSAs never seek to appeal 
within-guideline sentences as unreasonable and very rarely request clearance to appeal below-
guideline sentences.  The Solicitor General’s unofficial rule, according to our sources at various 
U.S. Attorney’s Offices and in the Solicitor General’s office, is that they generally will not 
approve appeals for sentences within 50% of a guideline range.  It is difficult for a trial attorney at 
Main Justice, who is likely younger and less senior than her Assistant U.S. Attorney counterpart, 
to insist on a higher sentence in a particular case, particularly when the local prosecutor claims 
her hands are tied by the judge. 
 92 See generally GEORGE FISHER, PLEA BARGAINING’S TRIUMPH: A HISTORY OF PLEA 
BARGAINING IN AMERICA (2003) (drawing this lesson from the history of the rise of plea 
bargaining during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries). 
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Government did so, the motion unlocked the Guidelines, allowing the 
sentencing judge to depart downward as much as he thought just.93  
Because the potential benefits were enormous, and there were almost no 
other ways around the stiff Guidelines, defendants faced enormous 
pressures to cooperate.  And the Government had to consent and file the 
motion; the Government could tie the district court’s hands by not doing 
so.94  The Government held all the power. 
Now, however, defendants request, and district judges grant, 
substantial assistance reductions without a government motion.95  Thus 
far, the Second Circuit, the only one to address the issue directly, has 
upheld this practice.96  Moreover, defendants have much more realistic 
hopes of leniency even if they refuse to cooperate with the Government.  
Cooperation is no longer the only way out of the Guidelines, and it 
carries plenty of risks of being branded a snitch and provoking one’s 
criminal associates to retaliate.  Thus, cooperation is comparatively less 
attractive than it once was, and defendants will be more reluctant to 
cooperate, unless perhaps prosecutors promise even greater sentence 
discounts.  The only possible exception is where defendants are up 
against statutory mandatory minimum sentences.  Judges remain 
powerless to unlock these on their own and depart downward, without 
Government motions, so defendants will still earn substantial benefits 
 93 See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 83, § 5K1.1.  A sentencing judge 
might still have to follow statutory mandatory-minimum sentences, but a Government motion can 
unlock those too.  See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e) (2006). 
 94 U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 83, § 5K1.1; see also United States v. 
Wallace, 22 F.3d 84 (4th Cir. 1994) (requiring the government to file a § 5K1.1 motion before a 
district court may grant a departure); United States v. Kelley, 956 F.2d 748, 757 (8th Cir. 1992) 
(“[T]he district court did not err in holding that it could not entertain a substantial assistance 
departure motion made by the defendant rather than the government.”); United States v. Levy, 
904 F.2d 1026, 1035 (6th Cir. 1990) (stating that a district court is under no duty or responsibility 
to entertain a defendant’s departure motion absent a government motion). 
 95 During the year or so between the Booker decision in January 2005 and the U.S. 
Sentencing Commission’s Report in March 2006, there were 258 cases in 61 districts in which a 
defendant’s cooperation with authorities was given as a reason for a non-government-sponsored 
below range sentence.  In 28 of these cases, substantial assistance was the only reason.  BOOKER 
REPORT, supra note 66, at 110, 113, and 115 tbl. 14. 
 96 See, e.g., United States v. Fernandez, 443 F.3d 19 (2d Cir. 2006) (holding that a 
government motion for substantial-assistance departure is no longer a prerequisite to district 
court’s reducing sentence below the guidelines range to reward the defendant for cooperating with 
authorities); Statement of Chairman of U.S. Sentencing Commission Judge Ricardo H. Hinojosa 
at hearing before a House judicial subcommittee (identifying issue of interaction between § 5K1.1 
and district courts’ authority to impose so-called “nonguidelines” or “variance” sentences as “one 
in need of clarifying legislation”), available at 
http://www.ussc.gov/booker_report/03_16_06Booker%20Testimony.pdf.  But see United States v. 
Germosen, 473 F. Supp. 2d 221, 226 (D. Mass. 2007) (Gertner, J.) (relying on United States v. 
Bermudez, 407 F.3d 536 (1st Cir. 2005), to conclude that even after Booker, a judge may not 
depart under § 5K1.1 without the requisite government motion); United States v. Crawford, 407 
F.3d 1174, 1182 (11th Cir. 2005) (vacating a sentence for several reasons, including the district 
court’s partial reliance on the defendant’s assistance to the government to depart from the 
Guidelines, absent a § 5K1.1 motion from the government). 
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by cooperating that they cannot reap in any other way. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
Forecasting is always a hazardous business, whether it involves 
weather, the stock market, or the Supreme Court’s sentencing whims.  
But as far as we can tell, Rita and Gall’s reasonableness review lets 
appellate courts ensure moderate consistency, though obviously less 
than under the mandatory Guidelines.  This approach is not theoretically 
consistent, in that it does allow district judges to find facts that overtly 
or covertly raise sentences.  The result will be more sentencing 
variation, whether under advisory Guidelines in the federal system, 
voluntary guidelines in some states, and jury fact-finding in some 
others.  On balance, this greater uncertainty and unpredictability gives 
judges leverage to counterbalance prosecutors.  Prosecutors, enjoying 
less unilateral power and less certainty, will probably have to offer 
greater sentencing discounts to induce guilty pleas.  Indeed, some line 
prosecutors welcome and will collude with this development, 
notwithstanding their superiors’ efforts to constrain them.  The 
pendulum, which had kept swinging toward prosecutors, is swinging 
back, at least until excessive leniency provokes legislatures to react with 
statutory mandatory sentences. 
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APPENDIX A 
Table I: States That Have Been Affected by the Blakely Decision 
 
Alaska – State v. Moreno, 151 P.3d 480, 483 (Alaska Ct. App. 
2006) (holding that Alaska’s pre-2005 sentencing scheme was not 
consistent with Blakely because aggravating factors were not found by a 
jury). 
Arizona – State v. Brown, 99 P.3d 15 (Ariz. 2004) (finding that 
Arizona’s presumptive non-capital sentencing scheme was inconsistent 
with Blakely). 
California – Cunningham v. California, 127 S. Ct. 856, 871 
(2007) (ruling that California’s determinate sentencing system violated 
the Court’s Sixth Amendment precedent from Apprendi to Blakely). 
Colorado – Lopez v. People, 113 P.3d 713, 724 (Colo. 2005) 
(finding that Colorado’s sentencing scheme was subject to the 
requirements and protections of Blakely because a judge could sentence 
outside the presumptive range upon finding aggravating factors). 
Connecticut – State v. Bell, 283 Conn. 748, 810-13 (Conn. 2007) 
(ruling that Connecticut’s persistent offender statute violated Apprendi 
and Blakely because it required the court to find that the defendant’s 
“history and character and the nature and circumstances of . . . [the 
defendant’s] criminal conduct indicate that extended incarceration and 
lifetime supervision will best serve the public interest”).  The Court 
found that the appropriate remedy was simply to excise the part of the 
statute that said, “the court is of the opinion that,” thereby removing the 
responsibility of the court to make a requisite finding.  Id. 
Hawaii – State v. Maugaotega, 168 P.3d 562, 556-57 (Haw. 2007) 
(finding that Hawaii’s extended-term sentencing scheme violated the 
Sixth Amendment after Blakely and Cunningham).  The court refused to 
fashion a remedy and awaits a legislative response. 
Illinois – Illinois does not appear to have been seriously affected 
by Blakely, but its first-degree murder statute, which allowed for an 
extended sentence based on a judge’s finding, had problems stemming 
from Apprendi.  See People v. Swift, 781 N.E.2d 292 (Ill. 2002); People 
v. Nitz, 848 N.E.2d 982 (Ill. 2006). 
Indiana – Smylie v. State, 823 N.E.2d 679, 685 (Ind. 2005) 
(holding that Indiana’s sentencing scheme violated the Sixth 
Amendment as interpreted in Blakely because it “mandates both a fixed 
term and permits judicial discretion in finding aggravating or mitigating 
circumstances to deviate from the fixed term”). 
Kansas – Kansas changed its sentencing scheme after Apprendi, 
anticipating Blakely’s holding.  See State v. Gould, 23 P.3d 801 (2001); 
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Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 305 (2004) (discussing with 
approval Kansas’ sending aggravating facts to juries in response to 
Apprendi).  Recently, the Kansas Supreme Court has ruled that a 
defendant’s sentence, which was increased upon a judge’s finding that 
he was a persistent sexual offender violated Gould and Blakely because 
it required the judge to find that his past sex crime was sexually 
motivated.  See State v. Allen, 153 P.3d 488, 493 (Kan. 2007). 
Maine – State v. Schofield, 895 A.2d 927 (Me. 2005) (holding that 
Maine’s sentencing statute that allowed a judge to increase the sentence 
based on a finding of heinousness was not consistent with Blakely). 
Michigan – Michigan maintains that its system is consistent with 
Blakely.  After Cunningham, the Supreme Court remanded a case back 
to Michigan, but the Michigan Supreme Court reaffirmed its original 
decision, upholding the constitutionality of Michigan’s sentencing 
scheme.  See Michigan v. McCuller, 739 N.W.2d 563 (Mich. 2007).  So, 
as of now, there is no official problem with Michigan’s system. 
Minnesota – State v. Shattuck, 704 N.W.2d 131 (Minn. 2005) 
(holding that Minnesota’s sentencing scheme which allowed for an 
upward departure from the presumptive sentence under mandatory 
guidelines violated Blakely). 
New Jersey – State v. Natale, 878 A.2d 724 (N.J. 2005) (holding 
that New Jersey’s presumptive sentencing scheme violated the Sixth 
Amendment as interpreted in Blakely). 
New Mexico – State v. Frawley, 172 P.3d 144, 152 (N.M. 2007) 
(holding that after Cunningham, New Mexico’s sentencing scheme 
violated the Sixth Amendment).  The court fashioned no remedy and 
awaits a legislative response. 
New York – New York State upheld its persistent offender statute 
in People v. Rivera, 833 N.E.2d 194 (N.Y. 2005).  However, a recent 
case in federal court on habeas has overruled Rivera and found that 
New York’s persistent offender statute violate Blakely principles.  See 
Portalatin v. Graham, 478 F. Supp. 2d 385 (E.D.N.Y. 2007) (holding 
that New York’s persistent felony statute is unconstitutional).  There is 
now a split within the Second Circuit on this issue.  Washington v. 
Poole, 507 F. Supp. 2d 342 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) also found the statute 
unconstitutional.  However, Bailey v. Rivera, 07 Civ. 2181, 2007 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 78753 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 24, 2007) and West v. Breslin, 06 
Civ. 4167, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 444 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 3, 2008) have 
upheld the constitutionality of the statute.  The cases are now 
consolidated and pending before the Second Circuit in Phillips v. Artus, 
2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 45697 (2006) (upholding the constitutionality of 
the statute). 
North Carolina – State v. Allen, 615 S.E.2d 256 (N.C. 2005) 
(holding that North Carolina’s mandatory guideline system violated 
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Blakely). 
Ohio – State v. Foster, 845 N.E.2d 470, 494 (Ohio 2006) (ruling 
that Ohio’s sentencing statutes “offend the constitutional principles 
announced in Blakely”). 
Oregon – State v. Dilts, 103 P.3d 95 (Or. 2004) (holding that 
Oregon’s guidelines violated the Sixth Amendment after Blakely). 
Tennessee – State v. Gomez, 239 S.W.3d 733 (Tenn. 2007) 
(concluding that Tennessee’s sentencing statute ran afoul of Blakely and 
Cunningham). 
Vermont – State v. Provost, 896 A.2d 55 (2005) (holding that 
Vermont’s murder statute was inconsistent with Apprendi and 
Blakely—“We hold that 13 V.S.A. § 2303(a) violates the rule in 
Apprendi and Blakely because it requires the sentencing court to weigh 
specific aggravating and mitigating factors not found by a jury beyond a 
reasonable doubt before imposing a sentence of life without parole.”). 
Washington – Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004). 
 
Table II: States That Have Responded by Sending Facts to the Jury 
 
Alaska – State v. Moreno, 151 P.3d 480, 483 (Alaska Ct. App. 
2006) (holding that while the pre-2005 sentencing law was not 
consistent with Blakely, it could be remedied by sending aggravating 
factors to a jury). 
Arizona – State v. Martinez, 115 P.3d 618, 624 (Ariz. 2005) 
(holding that “once a jury implicitly or explicitly finds one aggravating 
factor, a defendant is exposed to a sentencing range that extends to the 
maximum punishment available . . .”). 
Colorado – Lopez v. People, 113 P.3d 713, 726, 729 (Colo. 2005) 
(holding that the presumptive sentencing statute would comply with 
Blakely if aggravating factors were found by the jury). 
Connecticut – State v. Bell, 283 Conn. 748, 811-12 (Conn. 2007) 
(removing the language in Connecticut’s statute that called for the court 
to make a determination, so that the responsibility would be left to the 
jury to make the requisite finding). 
Illinois – People v. Swift, 781 N.E.2d 292, 300 (Ill. 2002) (holding 
that aggravating factors must be proved by a jury after Apprendi). 
Indiana – Smylie v. State, 823 N.E.2d 679, 686 (Ill. 2005) 
(reaching the conclusion that the appropriate way to remedy the 
sentencing statute would be to send aggravating factors to the jury).  
Note, however, that within weeks the state legislature intervened and 
changed the law.  The legislature did not follow the Indiana Supreme 
Court, and instead removed the fixed term part of the statute—giving 
the judge more discretion.  See Anglemyer v. State, 868 N.E.2d 482, 478 
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(Ill. 2007) for a discussion on the history in Indiana.  The statute is cited 
in Part D. 
Kansas – Legislature made this change; see below. 
Maine – State v. Schofield, 895 A.2d 927, 937 (2005) (requiring 
that a jury find the “heinousness” element that was required to increase 
the sentence). 
Minnesota – Legislature made this change; see below. 
North Carolina – Legislature made this change; see below. 
Oregon – Legislature made this change; see below. 
Vermont – Legislature made this change; see below. 
Washington – Legislature made this change; see below. 
 
Table III: States That Have Responded by Interpreting Guidelines as 
Voluntary 
 
California – After Cunningham, the legislature moved quickly to 
change the sentencing law (see below).  However, in addressing those 
individuals caught in the middle (like Cunningham), the California 
Supreme Court adopted the same remedy as the legislature as for re-
sentencing.  Essentially, the presumptive sentence scheme is now 
discretionary: When the statute gives three possible sentences, “the 
choice of the appropriate term shall rest within the sound discretion of 
the court.”  See People v. Sandoval, 161 P.3d 1146, 1157-64 (Cal. 2007) 
(holding that the appropriate remedy for re-sentencing should be the 
same as the remedy adopted by the legislature: namely, that the trial 
judge would have discretion to adopt any of the three possible 
sentences, without any presumption of adopting the middle sentence or 
any requirement of finding aggravating factors). 
Indiana – This is what the Indiana legislature essentially did when 
it changed its law.  See below. 
New Jersey – The New Jersey Supreme Court, in Natale, held that 
New Jersey’s presumptive sentencing scheme was not consistent with 
Blakely.  It held that the appropriate remedy would be to remove the 
presumptive aspect of the statute, giving judges discretion to sentence 
anywhere within the statutory minimum and maximum.  State v. Natale, 
878 A.2d 724, 737 (N.J. 2005). 
Ohio – State v. Foster, 845 N.E.2d 470, 498 (Ohio 2006) 
(“Accordingly, we have concluded that trial courts have full discretion 
to impose a prison sentence within the statutory range and are no longer 
required to make findings or give their reasons for imposing maximum, 
consecutive, or more than the minimum sentences.”). 
Tennessee – Tennessee essentially did this when the legislature 
changed the law.  See below. 
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Table IV: States Where the Legislature Has Responded 
 
Alaska – Alaska changed its law to keep the basic presumptive 
sentencing structure, but now submits all aggravating factors to a jury.  
See ALASKA STAT. §§ 12.55.155(f), 12.55.125(c) (2008). 
Arizona – Arizona now requires that aggravating factors that 
increase a sentence be found beyond a reasonable doubt by the trier of 
fact (the jury).  See ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 13-702.01 (LexisNexis 2008). 
California – After Cunningham, the California legislature quickly 
adopted SB 40, which removed the presumption of sentencing a 
defendant to the middle sentence (when the statute gave three possible 
sentence), and instead gave the court discretion to choose the sentence.  
See CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170(b) (West 2008). 
Illinois – Illinois now requires aggravating factors to be proved by 
a jury (unless jury trial is waived) beyond a reasonable doubt.  See 730 
ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/5-8-1 (West 2008). 
Indiana – Indiana removed the fixed-term part of their sentencing 
scheme, essentially giving the judge broad discretion within a range.  
See IND. CODE ANN. §§ 35-50-2-1.3(a), 35-38-1-7.1 (West 2008). 
Kansas – Kansas changed its statute after a Kansas Supreme Court 
decision before Blakely.  See above for more details.  KAN. STAT. ANN. 
§§ 21-4716(b), 21-4718(b) (2008). 
Minnesota – After Shattuck, the Minnesota legislature changed its 
sentencing scheme by sending aggravating factors to a jury.  MINN. 
STAT. ANN. § 244.10, subdiv. 5 (West 2008). 
North Carolina – The North Carolina legislature adopted changes 
in the state’s sentencing system requiring all aggravating factors to be 
found by a jury.  See N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 15A-1340.16(a1) (West 
2008). 
Oregon – The Oregon legislature responded to Dilts by changing 
the law to send aggravating factors to the jury.  See 2005 Or. Laws ch. 
463, §§ 3(1), 4(1). 
Tennessee – Tennessee changed its law in 2005 to comply with 
Blakely, and now gives judges discretion to sentence within the 
statutory range—effectively making their sentencing guidelines 
advisory.  TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-35-210(c) (2008). 
Vermont – Vermont changed its murder statute and now 
aggravating factors must be proved by a jury.  See VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 
13, § 2303 (2008). 
Washington – Washington responded to Blakely by changing its 
statute; now aggravating factors must found by the jury.  See WASH. 
REV. CODE ANN. §§ 9.94A.535, 9.94A.537 (West 2008). 
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APPENDIX B: STATES UNAFFECTED BY THE BLAKELY DECISION 
 
Alabama (voluntary guidelines). 
Arkansas (jury sentencing). 
Delaware – Quandt v. State, 933 A.2d 1250 (De. 2007) (holding 
that guidelines are voluntary and thus there is no Blakely problem). 
District of Columbia (voluntary guidelines). 
Florida (indeterminate judicial sentencing). 
Georgia (indeterminate judicial sentencing). 
Idaho – Idaho v. Stover, 104 P.3d 969 (Id. 2005) (finding no 
Blakely problem with Idaho’s sentencing scheme). 
Iowa (indeterminate judicial sentencing). 
Kentucky (jury sentencing). 
Louisiana (indeterminate judicial sentencing). 
Maryland – Kang v. State, 163 Md. App. 22 (2005) (holding that 
Maryland’s guidelines are purely voluntary). 
Massachusetts (indeterminate judicial sentencing). 
Mississippi (indeterminate judicial sentencing). 
Missouri (jury sentencing). 
Montana (indeterminate judicial sentencing). 
Nebraska (indeterminate judicial sentencing). 
Nevada (indeterminate judicial sentencing). 
New Hampshire (indeterminate judicial sentencing). 
North Dakota (indeterminate judicial sentencing). 
Oklahoma (jury sentencing). 
Pennsylvania – Commonwealth v. Yuhasz, 923 A.2d 1111 (Pa. 
2007) (upholding Pennsylvania’s sentencing scheme after Blakely). 
Rhode Island (indeterminate judicial sentencing). 
South Carolina (indeterminate judicial sentencing). 
South Dakota (indeterminate judicial sentencing). 
Texas (jury sentencing). 
Utah (voluntary guidelines). 
Virginia (voluntary guidelines). 
West Virginia (indeterminate judicial sentencing). 
Wisconsin – State v. Jones, 2006 WI App. 101, 293 Wis.2d 363 
(2006) (finding that Wisconsin’s sentencing guidelines are voluntary 
and thus pose no problem after Blakely). 
Wyoming (indeterminate judicial sentencing). 
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APPENDIX C: STATES THAT HAVE ADDRESSED SENTENCE-STACKING 
AFTER BLAKELY 
Table I: States That Allow Stacking 
 
Alaska – Vandergriff v. State, 125 P.3d 360, 362 (Alaska Ct. App. 
2005) (holding that the Alaska statute that gave a judge discretion to 
impose consecutive sentences posed no problems under Apprendi or 
Blakely). 
Colorado – People v. Lehmkuhl, 117 P.3d 98, 106-07 (Colo. App. 
2005) (ruling that a court may impose consecutive sentences as long as 
each sentence for each count is below the statutory maximum). 
Hawaii – State v. Kahapea, 141 P.3d 440, 453 (Haw. 2006) 
(finding that consecutive sentences did not violate the defendant’s Sixth 
Amendment rights as interpreted in Apprendi or Blakely). 
Illinois – People v. Wagener, 752 N.E.2d 430, 441-42 (Ill. 2001) 
(upholding the use of consecutive sentencing after Apprendi); see also 
People v. Carney, 752 N.E.2d 1137 (Ill. 2001).  Even though both cases 
predate Blakely, an Illinois intermediate appellate court has held that 
Blakely does not alter the analysis.  See People v. Tabb, 870 N.E.2d 
914, 929 (Ill. App. Ct. 2007), appeal denied, 225 Ill.2d 670 (2007). 
Indiana – Smylie v. State, 823 N.E.2d 679, 686 (Ind. 2005) 
(finding no constitutional problem with consecutive sentencing because 
the statute did “not erect any target or presumption concerning 
concurrent or consecutive sentences”). 
Maine – State v. Keene, 927 A.2d 398, 407-08 (Me. 2007) (ruling 
that Apprendi principles do not apply to consecutive sentences and 
upholding the sentencing court’s decision to impose consecutive 
sentences). 
Minnesota – State v. Senske, 692 N.W.2d 743, 746-48 (Minn. 
App. 2005) (ruling that consecutive sentences may be imposed and do 
not violate Blakely principles). 
New Jersey – State v. Abdullah, 872 A.2d 746, 756-57 (N.J. 2005) 
(holding that the imposition of a consecutive sentence did not “exceed 
the statutory maximum for Blakely or Apprendi purposes”). 
New York – People v. Murray, 785 N.Y.S.2d 675, 639 (Sup. Ct. 
2004), aff’d, 829 N.Y.S.2d 106 (App. Div. 2007) (upholding the 
imposition of consecutive sentences where no single sentence exceeded 
the statutory maximum). 
Tennessee – State v. Higgins, No. E2006-01552-CCA-R3-CD, 
2007 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 763, at *42 (Sept. 27, 2007) (upholding 
the imposition of consecutive sentences even after a judge makes 
certain findings). 
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Table II: States That Allow Stacking But Do Not Require Factfinding 
 
California – People v. Black, 161 P.3d 1130, 1144-46 (Cal. 2007) 
(concluding that the imposition of consecutive sentences was consistent 
with Apprendi, Blakely, and Cunningham). 
Iowa – State v. Jacobs, 644 N.W.2d 695, 698-99 (Iowa 2001) 
(holding that the imposition of consecutive sentences does not violate 
Apprendi or Due Process). 
Kansas – State v. Bramlett, 41 P.3d 796 (Kan. 2002) (upholding 
the imposition of consecutive sentences because a court has complete 
discretion whether to run multiple sentences concurrently or 
consecutively and each individual sentence was within the presumptive 
sentence range). 
Texas – Barrows v. State, 207 S.W.3d 377 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006) 
(holding that there is no Apprendi violation when a judge orders that 
sentences run consecutively); Alameda v. State, 235 S.W.3d 218, 223-
24 (Tex. Crim. 2007) (ruling that cumulative sentences did not violate 
Apprendi or its progeny). 
Wyoming – Gould v. State, 151 P.3d 261, 267-68 (Wyo. 2006) 
(finding that consecutive sentences did not violate Apprendi or Blakely). 
 
Table III: Federal Circuits 
 
First – United States v. Ziskind, 471 F.3d 266, 271 (1st Cir. 2006) 
(affirming the imposition of consecutive sentences). 
Second – United States v. Brown, 152 F. App’x 55, 58 (2d Cir. 
2005) (holding that a district court judge had discretion under 18 U.S.C. 
§ 3584(b) to impose consecutive sentences, but overturned the 
defendant’s sentence because the trial court did not properly exercise 
discretion by considering the factors in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)); see also 
United States v. Matera, 489 F.3d 115, 124 (2d Cir. 2007) (upholding 
the imposition of consecutive sentences). 
Third – United States v. Guzman, 207 F. App’x 219, 226-27 (3d 
Cir. 2006) (affirming the District Court’s imposition of consecutive 
sentences). 
Fifth – United States v. Candia, 454 F.3d 468 (5th Cir. 2006) 
(holding that after Booker, the imposition of a federal sentence that ran 
consecutive to a state sentence was within the district court’s discretion 
and therefore acceptable). 
Sixth – United States v. Shannon, 186 F. App’x 648 (6th Cir. 
2006) (holding that the imposition of consecutive sentences did not a 
violate Apprendi or Booker when the sentence for each count was below 
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the statutory maximum). 
Eighth – United States v. Zatarain, 250 F. App’x 198 (8th Cir. 
2007) (affirming the imposition of consecutive sentences). 
Ninth – United States v. Fifield, 432 F.3d 1056, 1067 (9th Cir. 
2005) (holding that “[b]ecause, under § 3584, a district court need not 
find any particular fact to impose consecutive sentences, the imposition 
of consecutive sentences does not violate the Sixth Amendment”). 
Tenth – United States v. Rodriguez-Quintanilla, 442 F.3d 1254 
(10th Cir. 2005) (upholding the imposition of consecutive sentences 
under 18 U.S.C. § 3584(a) after Booker); see also United States v. Bly, 
142 F. App’x 339 (10th Cir. 2005) (affirming the trial court’s decision 
to impose nine consecutive terms of twenty years). 
Eleventh – United States v. Mooney, No. 07-12988, 2008 U.S. 
App. LEXIS 163, at *7 (11th Cir. Jan. 3, 2008) (explaining that the 
district court was within its discretion to impose consecutive sentences). 
 
Table IV: States That Do Not Allow Stacking 
 
Ohio – Ohio v. Foster, 845 N.E.2d 470, 490-91 (Ohio 2006) 
(holding that the imposition of consecutive sentences violated Blakely 
because it required a judicial finding). 
Oregon – State v. Ice, 170 P.3d 1049, 1059 (Or. 2007) (ruling that 
consecutive sentences violated Apprendi and Blakely because Oregon’s 
statute judicial fact-finding is required to impose consecutive 
sentences), cert. granted 128 S. Ct. 1657 (2008). 
Washington – In re VanDelft, 147 P.3d 573, 578-79 (Wash. 2007) 
(holding that the imposition of consecutive sentences violated Apprendi 
and Blakely because the fact-finding required to impose consecutive 
sentences should be made by a jury).  But see State v. Cubias, 120 P.3d 
929 (Wash. 2005) (upholding the imposition of consecutive sentences 
under a different part of the statute). 
